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ABSTRACT 
While the financial crisis of 2008-2009 led to the great collapse of international trade, the 
European debt crisis in 2010-2013 did not have such a drastic impact on trade. The collapse 
has been studied a lot in recent empirical literature, but the European debt crisis has not 
been investigated thoroughly yet. This paper looks into the impact of economic growth in 
European exporters and in their export destination markets on export performance as 
reflected in total export growth and growth in various export margins. Our findings point to 
an important role for both demand and supply side factors.  
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 had a tremendous impact on economic growth as 
well as on international trade. This period, broadly referred to as the Great Recession, 
witnessed a dramatic fall in global gross domestic product (GDP). At the same time, global 
exports and imports collapsed even more drastically, leading to the so-called Great Trade 
Collapse. Economic growth remained sluggish ever since in many countries, while global 
trade experienced a remarkable recovery after the crisis (Studnicka and Van Hove, 2015). 
Hence, growth and trade appeared to be very much linked during the crisis, but this link is 
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far from obvious in the subsequent recovery period. In particular for Europe, the global crisis 
was followed by a European debt crisis, causing a so-called ‘double dip crisis’, during which 
various EU member states suffered near collapse due to unsustainable public finances and a 
failing bank sector. 
This paper looks into the impact of economic growth on dynamics in European exports 
during the period 2003-2013. Europe was hit hard by the global financial crisis leading to a 
substantial decline in European exports since mid-2008. By early 2011 European exports 
recovered to their pre-crisis levels, and have kept on increasing ever since. Trade was not 
much to blame for this global crisis, but it did play a role in shaping the European debt crisis. 
As argued by Berger & Nitsch (2014) and Chen et al. (2013) macroeconomic imbalances were 
caused by asymmetric trade shocks before the crisis. The rise of China and other emerging 
economies generated demand for machinery from Germany, while for southern European 
countries these emerging economies were competitors on export markets. This led to large 
current account deficits that were made possible by cheap financing within the European 
Monetary Union. The 2010-2013 Eurozone crisis led to austerity measures in some, mostly 
peripheral, EU members aimed at improving competitiveness through internal devaluation. 
The financial sector and the real economy were both strongly affected, but the impact on 
the total value of international trade was not that obvious. However, one would expect that 
the Eurozone crisis has some impact on European export patterns as well.  
The literature provides substantial evidence on the evolution and determinants of trade 
during the trade collapse period. The existing evidence emphasizes the role of demand 
factors. Haddad et al. (2010) decompose product-level trade into extensive and intensive 
trade margins, and the latter into price and quantity effects for imports of US, Brazil, 
Indonesia and the EU. They find that the extensive margin plays only a small role. At the 
intensive margin there was a negative change in prices and an even larger negative change 
in the quantity for most traded products. This suggests that the collapse is mostly demand 
related. However, there are differences between various types of good. Eaton et al. (2011) 
come to a similar conclusion using a general equilibrium trade model with four types of 
shocks. The demand shock appears to play the most important role. 
However, apart from demand, also supply factors as well as the interconnectedness of 
trading partners appear to affect the trade evolution during the crisis period. Chor & 
Manova (2012) stress the importance of access to the trade credit. This implies that the 
collapse in trade was affected through contractions in the financial sector. Levchenko et al. 
(2010) conclude based on disaggregated US data that most of the unexpected reduction is 
due to up- and downstream linkages (highly interconnected global trade chains) and the 
composition of trade which includes more durable goods compared to GDP. Similarly, 
Anderton & Tewolde (2011), who analyse OECD members’ total trade flows on macro-level 
data, find that high import-intensity of exports and import-intensive investment 
expenditures explain most of the decline at the country-level. Stockbuilding, business 
confidence and credit conditions played a role too. Finally, Bems et al. (2012) point to the 
additional role of protectionist policies and inventory adjustments. Hence, generally 
speaking, one can say that the evidence so far suggests that a variety of demand and supply 
side factors led to the collapse of global trade during the global financial crisis. 
Some studies analyse firm level trade data to measure the impact of the crisis. Behrens et al. 
(2013) find that Belgian firms’ export declined mainly at the intensive margin during the 
crisis, and recovered afterwards. By contrast, the extensive margin was not affected. Similar 
results were obtained by Bricongne et al. (2012) on French firm level data. In addition they 
find some evidence of a larger collapse in sectors depending on external finance. Békés et al. 
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(2011) study the impact of the crisis on a survey sample of firms from 7 EU countries. They 
find a heterogeneous response from firms even within sectors. There are differences 
between the countries too. This is driven by the destinations in which firms are active, e.g. a 
negative impact due to more trade with US and positive impact from trade with China and 
India, as well as domestic policy variables, e.g. in countries with larger stimulus the firms 
suffered less. 
In contrast with the extensive evidence on the great trade collapse, empirical evidence on 
the impact of the European debt crisis on international trade is still very scarce. For more 
information about the European debt crisis from a macroeconomic and monetary 
perspective see for example Lane (2012) and De Grauwe & Ji (2013). 
Therefore, this paper extends this recent literature by studying individual EU members 
before and during the trade collapse, and afterwards during the European debt crisis. Our 
aims are two-fold. First, we aim to identify the determinants of export performance before, 
during and after the crisis period(s), and compare them to the long-run determinants. We 
follow a very detailed approach by analysing quarterly product-level bilateral export data for 
27 EU countries (all EU member states except Croatia). This approach allows us to test 
various hypotheses. First, in line with the literature, we test whether low economic growth 
(i.e. declining demand) is responsible for the negative impact of the crisis on exports. 
Related to this, we test whether the real effective exchange rate is affecting export growth 
too. Secondly, we test whether export dynamics are due to supply side factors, in particular 
exporters’ supply potential, exporters’ labour cost evolutions and access to credit financing. 
The latter factors are particularly interesting in the context of the European debt crisis and 
its aftermath. Thirdly, we test whether European exporters strongly focused on the intra-EU 
market, respectively on the Chinese export market (as the main emerging market), 
experience different export growth rates. Finally, the fourth hypothesis we test is whether 
product diversification (the number of exported products) or geographical diversification 
(the number of export destinations) shelters exporters during and after the crisis too. In 
other words, we test whether countries with more diverse exports, in terms of the number 
of products or in terms of the number of destination markets, were less exposed during the 
recession. 
Our second aim is to analyse through which margins these determinants affect export 
growth. Following Bernard et al. (2009) and Haddad et al. (2010), we distinguish between 
the intensive and extensive margin of exports. We further decompose the extensive margin 
into the (net) export destination extensive margin and the (net) export product extensive 
margin, as exports can either be geographically diversified or be characterised by product 
differentiation. Studying the role of various factors affecting export performance for each of 
these margins is an innovative approach within the literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as following. In the second section we present some 
stylised facts regarding EU members’ exports. In section 3, we formally decompose export 
growth into intensive and extensive margins based on the methodology developed in 
Bernard et al. (2009). Section 4 discusses the empirical estimation methodology. Section 5 
contains the results of the empirical analysis and a discussion of these results. The last 
section provides conclusions and a discussion on possible future research. 
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2. Stylised Facts on EU Exports and Crisis 
In this section we provide stylised fact regarding the impact of the crisis on EU members 
exports in terms of total value, and later on number of products and destinations.  
Trade data comes from Eurostat’s Comext dataset. It includes information for all 27 EU 
members including for years before their accession to the EU. We use total bilateral exports 
by each EU 27 member state for each product from January 2003 to March 2013. Like in 
Levchenko et al. (2010) or Eaton et al. (2011) monthly data are converted into quarterly in 
order to reduce the noise. 
Data comes disaggregated by products based on the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN8). 
One major issue is changes in nomenclature. To account for this at least partially, we use the 
Van Beveren et al. (2012) algorithm and concordance files to create a time-consistent 
nomenclature1. Confidential trade and corrections due to erroneous codes are omitted, 
which results in 8,149 distinct product categories in every period. A summary of the number 
of changes in provided in Table . 
Table    Changes in nomenclature 2003-2013. 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Definition change n/a 0 11 3 163 0 0 75 1 141 1 
New category n/a 273 97 486 917 75 127 180 137 902 35 
Removed 
category 
503 175 740 1039 96 257 306 281 818 42 n/a 
No. of categories 
10,40
4 
10,17
4 
10,09
6 9,842 9,720 9,699 9,569 9,443 9,299 9,383 9,376 
            
After 
concordance 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 
1 to 1 86.2% 87.6% 88.3% 89.9% 90.7% 91.0% 92.0% 93.3% 94.5% 94.7% 94.8% 
2 to 1 9.5% 8.7% 8.3% 7.1% 6.3% 6.0% 5.3% 4.3% 3.5% 3.1% 3.0% 
3 to 1 2.4% 2.0% 1.9% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.4% 1.2% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 
4 to 1 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 
5 or more to 1 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 
Changes at 8-digit level, without confidential trade and corrections due to erroneous codes. New 
categories are created at the beginning and removed at the end of the year. 
 
We restrict the bilateral dimension to the 100 largest trading partners. Based on 2012 data, 
they jointly account for 98.9% of total exports. They include all 27 EU countries and 73 other 
countries and territories. This makes data more tractable, but still includes most of the 
trade. For list of partners see Table 1. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 For years after 2010 concordance files were added from Eurostat Ramon server. 
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Table 1   List of included trading partners 
EU Core 
France, Netherlands, Germany, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Finland, Austria (11) 
EU South Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Malta, Cyprus (6) 
EU CEE 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia (10) 
Other European 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Gibraltar, Turkey, Albania, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Russian Fed., Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia & 
Montenegro & Kosovo2 (14) 
Africa 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Angola, Kenya, South Africa (18) 
North America United States, Canada (2) 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Mexico, Panama, Cuba, Dominican Rep., Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina (12) 
Middle East and 
Central Asia 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh (17) 
East, SE Asia with 
Oceania 
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, China, Rep of 
Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand (13) 
Number in parenthesis is a number of partners included. First three rows include 27 EU countries that 
are also exporters in the data. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 give a graphical overview of total exports from the first quarter of 2003 
up to the first quarter of 2013. The numbers reported are unweighted averages broken 
down by region as defined in Table 1. In Figure 1 exports are presented as an index with 
base in 2003q1, while Figure 2 presents yearly growth rates. Throughout this paper we use 
quarterly data with growth rates from the corresponding quarter of the previous year, for 
example growth between 2003q1 and 2004q1. This approach reduces the effect of seasonal 
fluctuations.  
The figures show that in the period before the crisis exports grew in all parts of the EU, but 
especially in Central and Eastern European countries (henceforth abbreviated as CEE) 
because of the catching up during the transition and EU accession periods. There is a clearly 
visible collapse in the second half of 2008. At first glance it seems that all parts of EU 
experienced a similar downfall and recovery because of the 2008-2009 global crisis. They are 
also confronted with the same slowdown in export growth more recently, coinciding with a 
slowdown of GDP growth. Quarterly total EU GDP index and its yearly growth are added to 
the figures for comparison. 
                                                     
2 In 2005 Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo became separate statistical entities. Hence for the following 
years we group them together and are throughout counted as one partner. 
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Figure 1   Total value of exports, average by region, 2003q1=100 
 
Export from 27 exporters to 100 largest partners. Country averages are not 
weighted. EU GDP is total GDP of 27 EU members. Source: Comext, own 
calculations. 
Figure 2   Yearly growth of average exports by region 
 
Export from 27 exporters to 100 largest partners. Country averages are not 
weighted. EU GDP is total GDP of 27 EU members. Source: Comext, own 
calculations. 
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Generally speaking, we can hence distinguish four phases based on the yearly growth rates 
in order to simplify the further analysis. They are: 
- (1) Pre-crisis: 2003q1 to 2008q3 
- (2) The collapse: 2008q4 to 2009q4 
- (3) Recovery:  2010q1 to 2011q4 
- (4) Post-recovery:  2012q1 to 2013q1 
Phase (2) and (3) are shaded blue and red respectively on both figures. This general picture 
obviously hides differences across individual EU countries. In the remainder of this paper we 
will study whether the determinants of export growth differ across these four phases as well 
as across these three EU regions. 
 
3. Trade Dynamics Decomposition: Empirical Methodology and 
Evidence 
To analyse the underlying dynamics in exports by each EU member state we decompose 
total export growth into an intensive margin and two extensive margins We use and later 
extend the methodology used by Haddad et al. (2010) which itself is based on Bernard et al. 
(2009) where it was originally used on US firm-level trade data during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
In a first step we decompose total export growth into an intensive and extensive margin. The 
total value of exports X in a given period t is the sum of  values of every product p –
destination d pair . When taking a time difference they are separated into three 
groups: the first group consists of continuously traded products (C), the second group 
contains new product-destination trade relations only at period t (N), and the third group 
consists of exiting product-destination trade relations only at t-1 (E): 
 
1 1 1 1
i
t t
i I
i i i i i i
t t t t t t t t
i I i I i C i N i E
X x
X X x x x x x x

   
    

      

    
 
 
(1) 
where the finite set I contains all i and consists of subsets C (continuous), N (new) and E 
(exit). Note that by definition 
1 0
i N
tx

   and 0
i E
tx
  . Expression (1) can be divided by 1tX   
to obtain percentage growth. Changes for all products are hence summed by group and then 
divided by . This gives an intensive margin (im) and two extensive margins (em) for 
every exporter. Furthermore both new and exit extensive margins can be combined to 
obtain net entry em. 
 
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
i i i i
t t t t
t t i C i N i E
t t t t
new exit
x x x x
X X
X X X X
im em em im em
 
   
   


   
    
  
 
 
(2) 
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Because net entry em depends also on the value of new and exit products, it is not possible 
to say for certain what is happening with the actual number of product-destinations. This 
definition differs from previously used definitions of the extensive margin that focus on 
numbers only.  
Figure 3 shows the average margins for all 27 exporters. Throughout the decade most of the 
growth contribution comes from the intensive margin, on average around 80%. The same 
holds also for the trade collapse and recovery periods. These are similar results to Haddad et 
al. (2010) who also use the same methodology on product-level data for Brazil, Indonesia, 
US and the EU as a whole. However, in the post-recovery phase the intensive margin has 
almost no impact and most of the export growth is achieved through other channels.  
As noted by Bernard et al. (2009) the short term extensive margin is relatively small because 
new exports and exits are on average smaller compared to continuous product-destinations. 
In their estimation the contribution of the extensive margin based on 1-year differences, it is 
on average 25%, but using 5-year differences it increases to around 50%, and in 10-year 
difference to 65%. Hence even if the contribution of the extensive margin is small in the 
short run, it does matter a lot in the longer run. 
In the second step we extend the decomposition by separating the extensive margins 
further into trade of existing products to new destinations, and the trade of new products. 
This enables us to clearly identify whether the changes in the extensive margins are driven 
by actual new products or by firms engaging in more markets with the same products. To 
achieve this, we repeat the calculations from equation (2) but only with product totals for all 
destinations. This results in product-only extensive margins, which we abbreviate as emp and 
imp. These are then subtracted from product-destination margins obtained earlier. The 
difference between them corresponds to trade in a new destination of existing products, or 
their exit from a destination. 
 
%
%
p p p p
new new new exit exit exit
d p d p
new new exit exit
X im em em em em em em
X im em em em em
             
     
 (3) 
Again new and exit margins can be combined, resulting in im + emd + emp  where emd + emp 
= em.  
Average margins are presented in Figure 3. The destination extensive margin always exceeds 
the product extensive margin, except for the year 2005. During the trade collapse both 
margins were negative, but compared to the intensive margin, their overall impact was 
small. Since 2010 the extensive margins are similar to their pre-crisis percentages. 
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Figure 3  Average margins with net extensive margin broken down 
 
Comext export data for 27 exporters and 100 largest partners. Country averages 
are not weighted. Own calculations. 
Table  provides average margins for each of four elements of em by phase. Even though the 
net effect is small, there are interesting underlying dynamics. During the collapse there were 
more destination exits than entries, mostly because of fewer entries than in previous phases 
(on average 0,082 before and 0.060 during the collapse). During the recovery period, the net 
entry destinations margin was positive again on, to a similar degree compared to before the 
crisis. Net entry product margin is close to zero during the collapse, but in 2010 and 2011q1 
it becomes positive again, mostly because of new products that were exported. Finally, the 
net entry product margin is close to zero again in 2012. Nevertheless, all this changes on em 
are relative small compared to those on im.  
Table 3   Average margin by phase 
Phase 
(1) 
em-d 
new 
(2) 
em-d 
exit 
(3) 
em-d 
net 
(4) 
em-p 
new 
(5) 
em-p 
exit 
(6) 
em-p 
net 
(7) 
 
em 
(8) 
 
im 
(9) 
total 
growth 
Pre-crisis 7.49 -5.63 1.86 2.11 -1.27 0.85 2.71 9.81 12.52 
The collapse 5.34 -6.22 -0.89 1.21 -1.31 -0.10 -0.99 -14.57 -15.56 
Recovery 7.12 -5.34 1.77 1.85 -0.99 0.86 2.63 15.74 18.37 
Post-recovery 6.76 -5.70 1.06 1.24 -0.92 0.33 1.38 1.82 3.20 
Percentage points 
(3)= (1) + (2) (6)= (4) + (5) (7)= (3) + (6) (9)= (7) + (8) 
 
Hence growth of average EU exports is driven primarily by growth in the intensive margin. As 
for extensive margin is concerned, the growth contribution comes from the growth in the 
number of destinations. 
4. Empirical Methodology 
In the previous section we decomposed total exports into three margins: the intensive 
margin, the net product extensive margin, and the net destination extensive margin. In this 
section we aim to explain the cross-temporal and cross-country heterogeneity in these 
margins, and hence the heterogeneity in total export growth, for exports by EU member 
states between 2004q1 and 2013q1. We estimate the following specification: 
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0 1 1 2 3 3 3 4jt year jmargin β β eurozone γ γ       β X β X β X  (4) 
Where margin corresponds to 1) total export growth, 2) the intensive margin of exports (im), 
3) the net destination extensive margin (destination em), or 4) the net product extensive 
margin (product em) for (European) exporter j in period t. Matrices X contain variables for 
three groups of explanatory variables. β are the vectors with the corresponding regression 
coefficients. We add both year fixed effects and exporter fixed effects, denoted by γ. Year 
fixed effects capture time-specific variation that affects all EU countries. Furthermore, we 
add a constant term β0 and β4 is the coefficient for a Eurozone dummy equal to one if the 
exporter belongs to the Eurozone. All variables that are either share or percentage change 
are transformed into percentage form (e.g. 0.20 growth of exports is now 20%). This is just a 
linear transformation that does not change the underlying model. 
This baseline regression is estimated for the full sample (27 EU countries), as well as for each 
of 3 regions, and for each of the 4 phases separately (see previous section). This allows us to 
analyse whether the determinants vary across regions or whether they are evolving over 
time. In particular we wonder whether the determinants of export dynamics are different 
for exporters in different parts of the EU and/or before, during or after the crisis. There are 
37 periods and 24 exporters3. Hence the maximum number of observations in each 
regression is: 888 in the full sample, 296, 222, 370 in regional subsamples, and 513, 135, 
216, 135 in the separate phase regressions. 
To determine the appropriate econometric estimation method we perform a series of tests 
on the regression of export growth on the selected variables. First, as a response to a highly 
significant Hausman test (p=0.0000), we choose to use a fixed effects estimation method 
instead of a random effects estimation method. The joint significance of all intercepts is 
0.0001. Furthermore, the Modified Wald test detects heteroskedasticity (p=0.0000), and 
with the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation we reject no AR(1) null (p= 0.0001). As 
expected, Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence strongly rejects the null hypothesis 
of no cross-sectional dependence (p = 0.0000), meaning that there is a correlation between 
exports in each period. As a result we need to use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors which are 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation robust (Hoechle, 
2007). They are used for all baseline regressions. 
Note that we could estimate the specification by dynamic panel methods, such as Anderson-
Hsiao IV or Arellano-Bond GMM estimation methods. Both are usually used when the 
number of cross-sectional units is large compared to the time dimension. In case of panel 
data with a small N, as is in our case, they can, however, be severely biased and imprecise 
(Bruno, 2006). Moreover, in case of cross-sectional dependence, which is severe in our 
sample, all estimation procedures that rely on IV and GMM are inconsistent (Sarafidis & 
Robertson, 2009). As a result we do not use the dynamic panel techniques. 
                                                     
3 Eurostat does not provide credit data for Denmark, Sweden and UK.  Hence for Core EU only 
Eurozone countries are included. Another possible candidate could be interbank interest rate like in 
Chor & Manova (2012). But this interest rate is under direct influence of ECB’s expansionary monetary 
policy. Hence it does not represent the actual cost of or access to credit. Moreover, it is set for the 
entire Eurozone, even though the actual financial sectors are very heterogeneous. Hence we do not 
use it. 
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We regress growth in total exports as well as growth in each margin on a set of 11 
explanatory variables. This will enable us to test the hypotheses that were outlined in the 
introduction, namely what is the impact of a decline in world demand, changes on the 
supply side in the labour market and the financial sector, the product-destination 
composition of exports, and through which margin they all affect export growth. Table 4 
provides a summary overview of all explanatory variables. 
Table 4   List of all explanatory variables 
Code Variable name Description 
 
DEMAND SIDE: 
 
WGDP 
Export-share weighted gross 
domestic product growth 
Percentage change compared to corresponding period of previous year. Based on millions 
of US dollars, volume estimates, fixed PPPs, OECD reference year, annual levels, seasonally 
adjusted.   For 39 countries4. Source: OECD.Stat. 
REER 
Change in real effective 
exchange rate 
Broad group (41 industrial countries), CPI deflated, percentage change 
compared to corresponding period of the previous year 
 
SUPPLY SIDE: 
 
EGDP 
Exporter’s home gross 
domestic product growth 
Percentage change compared to corresponding period of previous year. 
EGDP_PC 
Exporter’s home GDP per 
capital level 
Euro per inhabitant, volume reference and exchange rates 2005, at market prices. 
Quarterly data for most, except one quarter of annual for: Romania (2003-), Greece (2012-
), and Italy (2012q3-)   
ULC Change in real unit labour cost 
Quarterly data, percentage change compared to corresponding period of the previous 
year, not seasonally adjusted. No data for DK, SE and UK. 
IRATE Private sector interest rates 
Annualised agreed percentage rate interest rates from monetary financial institutions for 
loans to non-financial corporations for new business, 1 million euros or less, maturity less 
than 1 year. 
 
DESTINATIONS AND PRODUCT COMPOSITION: 
 
PRODUCTS Number of products exported. Number of distinct products that were exported in a given quarter. Source: Comext. 
DEST_PP 
Average number of 
destinations exported per 
product. 
Number of product-destinations pairs divided by number of distinct products, for every 
quarter for every exporter. Source: Comext. 
INTRA Share of intra-EU trade Country’s share of export to EU destinations in total exports. Source: Comext. 
CHINA Share of trade to China Country’s share of export to China destinations in total exports. Source: Comext. 
EUROZONE Eurozone dummy 
Value 1 for: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (2008-), Estonia (2011-), Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta (2008-), Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia (2009-), 
Slovenia (2007-), and Spain.  
 
Source: Eurostat, unless specified otherwise 
The first group of explanatory variables reflects export demand. We use two measures to 
capture the demand side effects. First, we use quarterly GDP growth for 39 export partner 
countries5. All GDP growth rates are weighted by the lagged share of each export destination 
in a particular EU member state’s total exports. By using lagged weights we avoid potential 
endogeneity. As such this weighted GDP growth measure (WGDP) reflects the average 
economic growth in each EU member state’s export markets. A priori we expect that an on-
average negative demand shock in export markets leads to a deterioration in export growth. 
As a second demand-related variable we use the change in real effective exchange rates 
(REER) with 41 countries. An increase in this variable means a strengthening of the currency 
                                                     
4 All OECD members, except Greece. Developing countries include: Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Russia, South Africa. 
5 They include 33 OECD members (all except Greece) and six emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, 
India, Indonesia, Russian Federation and South Africa. Unfortunately OECD provides data for China only 
for the last few periods. Hence China is excluded. 
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what makes exports more expensive in the importer countries and therefore the exporter 
loses competiveness. Hence we expect a negative coefficient. 
The second group of explanatory variables consists of supply side variables. Ideally, we want 
information about business demographics to capture enterprise births and deaths. If there 
are fewer firms on the market, then one would expect there to be fewer firms exporting, 
which would reduce the extensive margin. Unfortunately, data have very limited coverage. 
Hence we use exporter’s GDP growth (EGDP) instead as a proxy for the general economic 
climate in the producing and exporting economy6. Secondly, we also add growth in GDP per 
capita (EGDP_PC) as this indicator is typically used as proxy for changes in the capital-labour 
ratio and hence in the exporter’s capital intensity. Next, we add changes in real unit labour 
costs (ULC). These reflect the evolution in cost competitiveness. It has been argued by 
Ordóñez et al. (2015) that labour unit costs in the Eurozone have diverged in the period 
before the crisis. As labour unit cost evolutions explain at least partly the asymmetries in 
economic growth within the EU, we wonder whether they also play a role in the evolution of 
EU exports. Due to the cost argument we expect a negative effect on export growth caused 
by larger growth in labour unit costs. Finally, we add interest rates to non-financial 
corporations (IRATE), which most directly capture access to credit as well as the costs of trade 
credit. As argued in Chor & Manova (2012) and Amiti & Weinstein (2011) firms in 
international trade face longer payments cycles and associated uncertainty. Hence they may 
not be able to engage in exporting without the trade credit. As a result high interest rates 
are expected to reduce export growth. 
The third group of variables captures the geographical orientation and product composition 
of EU members’ exports. As variables for the former we use the share of intra-EU exports 
(INTRA) and the share of exports to China (CHINA), which is not included in the weighted GDP 
growth variable directly. We expect a negative impact of a larger share of intra-EU exports 
for two reasons. First, the EU market is a relatively stable but also saturated market. As such, 
potential export growth is restricted, compared to larger export potentials in emerging 
markets. Secondly, since the EU was hit not only by the global financial crisis, but also by the 
consecutive sovereign debt crisis, reduced economic growth in the EU is likely to cause lower 
export growth too. The opposite holds for the share of exports to China. As the main 
emerging economy, China reflects a large potential for European exports. A more intensive 
trade relationship with China is likely to boost exports. For the product composition of EU 
exports we include the number of products that are exported in a given quarter (PRODUCTS) 
and the average number of export destinations across exported products in a given quarter 
(DEST_PP). As such we will be able to test whether countries with more product 
diversification or more geographical diversification in their exports were able to withstand 
the crisis better.  Finally, we also add a Eurozone dummy (EUROZONE) to test for specific 
Eurozone effects. 
By controlling for various potential explanations for the observed dynamics in export growth 
and the related margins, we aim to shed some light on the precise determinants of the 
underlying dynamics. This will derive a more complete explanation for the export dynamics 
before, during and after the crisis. 
 
                                                     
6 Since exports are by definition part of GDP there could be some correlation and endogeneity. 
Although one could subtract exports from GDP to correct for this, we follow the literature and use total 
GDP, including exports. 
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5. Determinants of European Export Growth 
Results for the baseline regression are reported in Tables 5 to 8, respectively for total export 
growth, the intensive margin, and both net extensive margins as response variables. Note 
that the selected explanatory variables explain a substantial share of variation in export 
growth, especially during collapse and recovery phase where within-R2 are 0.779 and 0.578 
respectively.  
In general, in Table 5, we observe an important role for economic growth in the export 
markets to explain differences in export growth in EU countries between 2004 and 2013. On 
average a one percentage point increase in the importing partners’ overall GDP growth leads 
to a 3.39 percentage points increase in exports by a European Union member state. 
Separate regressions for each phase reveal that this coefficient is even higher during the 
collapse and following recovery period, while even negative before the crisis and 
insignificant in the post-recovery phase. The importance of the demand side was already 
stressed by several related studies, like Eaton et al. (2011), Levchenko et al. (2010) and Bems 
et al. (2012). In particular, our finding is in line with the finding of Freund (2009) that during 
the economic downturn the income elasticity increases. In addition, our decomposition 
allows us to measure how this demand effect affects the different margins. Comparing 
Tables 6, 7 and 8, we find that most of the export demand driven changes are on the 
intensive margin. In addition, contribution to the destination expensive margin is positive 
and significant too, but the estimated coefficient is much smaller. This implies that the 
partners’ economic growth increases mainly the intensity of exports by EU member states, 
but it also creates new destinations for existing products. 
Surprisingly, in the pre-crisis phase, the weighted partner GDP growth coefficient is negative. 
One possible explanation is that economic growth in rapidly growing emerging countries 
before the crisis caused severe competition on export markets, in particular to southern EU 
members, as is argued by Chen et al. (2013). Hence it is plausible to have a negative partner 
growth impact on export growth. This would also explain why the WGDP coefficient is lower 
for South EU than for Core EU and CEE.  This negative coefficient is observed only on both 
extensive margins. This means that European exporters were losing destinations and 
products, while exports neither increased, nor decreased on markets where they remained 
active, due to growth in partners’ GDP in the pre-crisis phase. 
Table 5   Baseline regression: export total growth 
Variable Overall Core South CEE Pre-crisis Collapse Recovery 
Post-
recovery 
WGDP 3.391*** 3.924*** 2.433*** 4.177*** -1.377** 3.169*** 8.407*** 0.684 
 0.455 0.622 0.520 0.551 0.640 0.285 1.169 1.200 
REER -0.287** -1.350*** -1.220*** -0.202* -0.307* -0.438* -0.026 -0.411 
 0.108 0.352 0.360 0.112 0.152 0.195 0.206 0.213 
EGDP 0.402*** 0.024 0.339 0.354*** 0.184 0.581** 0.334 0.517*** 
 0.116 0.293 0.363 0.114 0.156 0.138 0.318 0.078 
EGDP_PC -0.003* -0.002 0.008 -0.007 -0.006** 0.008* -0.007** 0.004 
 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
ULC -0.351** -0.019 -0.703** -0.479*** -0.229 -0.245*** -0.608*** -0.872** 
 0.146 0.390 0.317 0.152 0.153 0.034 0.146 0.171 
IRATE 0.677** 1.146 2.174 0.861*** 0.751 0.006 2.373 0.373 
 0.315 1.169 1.845 0.238 0.516 0.107 1.505 1.385 
PRODUCTS 0.001 -0.009*** 0.000 0.003 0.007** -0.004 0.001 0.009* 
 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.003 
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Variable Overall Core South CEE Pre-crisis Collapse Recovery 
Post-
recovery 
DEST_PP 0.556** 0.569* -0.645 1.122 1.692** 0.629 0.453 -0.331 
 0.251 0.305 0.779 1.367 0.783 0.543 0.861 0.168 
INTRA -0.173 0.359 0.050 -0.638* 0.071 -0.292 -0.215 -0.053 
 0.158 0.335 0.183 0.318 0.212 0.310 0.337 0.154 
CHINA 0.141 1.370 -1.424 -2.420** 0.053 -1.230 -2.502** 0.046 
 0.684 1.118 1.146 1.148 1.245 0.698 0.942 0.401 
EUROZONE 1.626  3.794 5.494* -2.542 3.676*** 16.646* 0.000 
 2.407  4.437 2.745 3.160 0.617 7.227 0.000 
         
Observations 784 288 187 309 377 120 191 96 
Groups 24 8 6 10 24 24 24 24 
Within R2 0.733 0.713 0.754 0.832 0.196 0.779 0.578 0.201 
Fixed effects: year, declarant. AR(1) lag order Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in italics: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6   Baseline regression: export intensive margin 
Variable Overall Core South CEE Pre-crisis Collapse Recovery 
Post-
recovery 
WGDP 2.996*** 3.519*** 2.174*** 3.563*** 0.245 2.565*** 7.449*** 1.927 
 0.357 0.499 0.388 0.510 0.263 0.277 1.114 1.187 
REER -0.242*** -1.404*** -0.741** -0.183** -0.337*** -0.111 0.042 -0.494*** 
 0.078 0.289 0.297 0.083 0.116 0.156 0.115 0.059 
EGDP 0.292*** -0.091 0.737** 0.312*** 0.315*** 0.283* 0.374* 0.605** 
 0.078 0.301 0.349 0.086 0.105 0.108 0.191 0.150 
EGDP_PC -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.007* -0.002* 0.009** -0.007** 0.009* 
 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 
ULC -0.344*** -0.079 -0.550* -0.425*** -0.152 -0.202*** -0.530*** 0.264** 
 0.112 0.338 0.291 0.097 0.127 0.024 0.085 0.075 
IRATE 0.249 1.994* 2.615** 0.517*** -0.189 -0.233 2.657* 0.172 
 0.165 0.991 1.240 0.170 0.284 0.228 1.226 1.231 
PRODUCTS 0.001 -0.004* 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.001 
 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.004 
DEST_PP 0.328* 0.336 0.594 0.393 0.377 0.226 -0.105 -1.048*** 
 0.182 0.237 0.624 0.912 0.538 0.692 0.581 0.131 
INTRA -0.217** 0.442** -0.411* -0.600*** -0.123 -0.379 -0.470 -0.618** 
 0.098 0.212 0.209 0.195 0.156 0.242 0.263 0.170 
CHINA 0.021 1.264** 0.311 -1.929** -0.399 0.158 -1.596* 2.108*** 
 0.534 0.590 1.111 0.931 0.895 0.676 0.768 0.345 
EUROZONE 0.644  -1.518 2.639 -2.528 -0.793 14.905** 0.000 
 1.571  3.808 1.944 1.921 0.693 5.454 0.000 
         
Observations 784 288 187 309 377 120 191 96 
Groups 24 8 6 10 24 24 24 24 
Within R2 0.770 0.781 0.729 0.863 0.207 0.770 0.658 0.331 
Fixed effects: year, declarant. AR(1) lag order Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in italics: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7   Baseline regression: export destination extensive margin 
Variable Overall Core South CEE Pre-crisis Collapse Recovery 
Post-
recovery 
WGDP 0.347*** 0.278*** 0.041 0.699*** -0.452** 0.524*** 0.470 0.704 
 0.089 0.083 0.219 0.154 0.212 0.045 0.264 0.732 
REER -0.039* -0.095 -0.103 -0.048 0.028 -0.251** -0.015 0.398* 
 0.023 0.063 0.164 0.036 0.050 0.063 0.102 0.161 
EGDP 0.034 0.049 -0.416* 0.015 -0.090* 0.185*** -0.080 -0.463 
 0.035 -0.046 -0.218 -0.038 -0.043 -0.025 -0.104 -0.236 
EGDP_PC 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.002 
 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
ULC -0.040 0.029 0.004 -0.020 -0.134*** -0.039 -0.059 -0.552*** 
 0.041 0.044 0.162 0.048 0.035 0.025 0.103 0.064 
IRATE 0.130 -0.058 -1.410 0.193** 0.158 0.112* -0.318 -0.245 
 0.087 0.163 0.875 0.089 0.212 0.042 0.227 1.002 
PRODUCTS 0.000 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.006* 0.002 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.007 
DEST_PP 0.160* 0.194** 0.011 -0.146 0.285* 0.208 0.136 0.777** 
 0.087 0.078 0.334 0.498 0.139 0.513 0.310 0.188 
INTRA 0.101 0.008 0.467*** -0.175 -0.045 -0.032 0.294 0.428 
 0.062 0.049 0.099 0.133 0.093 0.090 0.159 0.276 
CHINA 0.054 -0.267 -0.636 0.000 -0.157 -0.261 0.017 -1.788** 
 0.233 0.213 0.679 0.379 0.308 0.973 0.502 0.466 
EUROZONE 0.696  3.889 1.302* -0.017 3.898*** 0.632 0.000 
 0.713  2.319 0.675 0.556 0.538 2.155 0.000 
         
Observations 784 288 187 309 377 120 191 96 
Groups 24 8 6 10 24 24 24 24 
Within R2 0.205 0.298 0.370 0.371 0.123 0.393 0.080 0.275 
Fixed effects: year, declarant. AR(1) lag order Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in italics: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 8   Baseline regression: export product extensive margin 
Variable Overall Core South CEE Pre-crisis Collapse Recovery 
Post-
recovery 
WGDP -0.096 0.036 0.100 -0.137 -1.422*** 0.109* 0.277* 0.265 
 0.124 0.225 0.165 0.102 0.443 0.044 0.146 0.238 
REER -0.052 0.197 -0.150 -0.037 -0.142* -0.067 -0.047 -0.108 
 0.044 0.135 0.193 0.071 0.080 0.050 0.044 0.061 
EGDP 0.124** 0.145* -0.055 0.077 0.037 0.113** 0.048 0.097 
 0.049 0.073 0.165 0.049 0.099 0.029 0.049 0.063 
EGDP_PC -0.001 -0.002 0.004** 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001* 
 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
ULC 0.046 0.058 0.050 -0.008 0.026 -0.026 -0.013 0.007 
 0.065 0.213 0.188 0.065 0.153 0.048 0.030 0.131 
IRATE 0.359 -0.486 0.473 0.285 1.250*** 0.163 -0.158 -0.211 
 0.226 0.430 0.945 0.198 0.335 0.120 0.347 0.607 
PRODUCTS 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.003 -0.003 -0.008** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.003 
DEST_PP 0.225 0.042 -0.430* 1.312*** 0.936* 0.258 0.449 0.094 
 0.165 0.293 0.239 0.357 0.503 0.407 0.240 0.303 
INTRA 0.089 0.006 0.086 0.204* 0.272** 0.109 0.004 -0.058 
 0.071 0.197 0.160 0.112 0.115 0.099 0.102 0.115 
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Variable Overall Core South CEE Pre-crisis Collapse Recovery 
Post-
recovery 
CHINA -0.239 -0.015 -0.927 -0.361 -0.053 -1.236 -0.926** -0.501 
 0.365 0.705 0.660 0.661 1.309 1.161 0.359 0.624 
EUROZONE -0.095  -1.151 2.943*** 0.189 0.434 -0.447 0.000 
 0.991  4.092 0.829 2.445 0.656 1.363 0.000 
         
Observations 784 288 187 309 377 120 191 96 
Groups 24 8 6 10 24 24 24 24 
Within R2 0.265 0.474 0.217 0.332 0.391 0.095 0.103 0.118 
Fixed effects: year, declarant. AR(1) lag order Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in italics: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The other demand side variable is the real effective exchange rate. As expected, the 
estimated effects are negative. An average real depreciation of the currency by one per cent 
increases export growth by 0.29 percentage points. For Core and South EU the coefficients 
are even larger at 1.35 and 1.22 respectively. In all cases REER affects exports only through 
the intensive margin. Even though REER is important in general, there are differences across 
time. Coefficients are not significant during the collapse and recovery phase, hence they do 
not seem to matter much at that time. By contrast, the impact is negative again during the 
post-recovery phase.  
Although we confirm that demand effects played a crucial role in the European export 
dynamics during and after the crisis, also supply side effects are important. On the supply 
side the most important factors are the real unit labour cost and the exporters’ GDP. On the 
one hand, a one percent increase in real unit labour costs (ULC) decreases export growth on 
average by 0.35 percentage points. Clearly, higher labour costs increase production costs, 
which hampers exports. Separate regressions again show a higher coefficient in the collapse 
phase and immediately afterwards, especially for CEE and South EU. As labour costs matter 
in particular for the competitiveness of labour intensive activities, it is not surprising that the 
more labour abundant EU countries are severely injured by increasing labour costs during 
and after the global economic downturn. Similar to the demand side, total export growth is 
affected mostly through the intensive margin, but during the post-recovery phase also 
partially through the destination extensive margin. On the other hand, the general economic 
climate is positively correlated with export growth. A one per cent growth in the exporter’s 
GDP (EGDP) on average corresponds to 0.40 per cent growth of exports. Similarly to unit 
labour costs, the exporter’s GDP starts to matter from the crisis period onwards and it 
affects mainly the intensive margin, although also the product extensive margin is positively 
affected in general. However, faster growing exporters were able to increase their 
destination extensive margin, as well as their product extensive margin, during the collapse. 
Hence domestic economic growth appears to enable exporters to increase the number of 
products and destination markets during the global crisis. 
The exporter’s GDP per capita, which captures differences in the exporters’ general 
economic development, plays no role for export growth on average. However, there is some 
limited evidence suggesting that it acts as a smoothing mechanism on the intensive margin. 
Countries with a high GDP per capita experienced a lower export growth in the pre-crisis and 
recovery phase. But when growth was declining, that is during the collapse and post-
recovery periods, a higher GDP per capita leads to higher export growth. This actually 
confirms the popular argument that the richer countries suffered less the crisis.  
The model includes also one financial variable, namely the short-term interest rate for non-
financial corporations that reflects trade credit conditions. Often the coefficient for IRATE is 
significantly positive, suggesting that higher interest rates are on average correlated with 
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higher export growth. Hence we find no evidence for a negative country-level effect of 
access to and costs of trade finance. A similar counterintuitive result for trade credit was 
obtained by Levchenko et al. (2010) as well, who find that US imports fell less in sectors that 
are dominated by countries with larger credit crunches.  
Finally, we look at the four explanatory variables about geographical orientation and 
product composition. They are all insignificant during the collapse and recovery for all four 
response variables7. Hence there is no evidence that country level diversification of products 
or destinations had any impact on the export growth during and right after the crisis. By 
contrast, in the post-recovery phase there are significant results for the intensive margin for 
the number of destinations, the share of intra-EU exports (both negative) and the share of 
exports to China (positive). Hence the export growth during the post-recovery phase is 
stimulated by a stronger focus on emerging markets rather than on the EU market or many 
other markets. However, the extensive margins show opposite signs and the overall effect 
on export growth is zero. For example: higher CHINA is correlated with higher intensive 
margin (β=2.11), but with lower destination em (β=-1.79). The opposite holds for the share 
of intra-EU trade, meaning that countries with a lot of intra-EU trade are exporting less on 
the existing markets, but on the other hand, they are finding new destinations for their 
existing products.  
The last variable in the model is the Eurozone dummy. It seems to have positive impact on 
export growth through the destination margin during the collapse (3.90 percentage points 
higher growth for Eurozone countries), and through the intensive margin during recovery 
period (14.9 percentage points higher for Eurozone countries). In other cases there is no 
significant impact either way. Hence Eurozone exporters withstood the crisis better than 
non-Eurozone exporters, mainly thanks to growth in the destination extensive margin during 
the crisis (an increase in the number of destinations for their exported products) as well as 
thanks to growth in the intensive margin during the recovery (an increase value of trade in 
existing products to existing markets). 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we study the export dynamics of the EU countries from 2003q1 until 2013q1. 
We observe some differences in the trend of products, destinations and total value of 
exports across the European Union. From a long-term perspective, the crisis had an impact 
only on the export intensity, and almost no impact on the number of products traded or the 
number of export destinations. We also show that there is substantial cross-country 
heterogeneity between EU countries as well as before, during and after the crisis.  
To investigate the short-term changes in export growth we use Bernard et al. (2009) 
decomposition. We use quarterly data, because the collapse and recovery occur rather 
quickly. Hence annual data would not capture the events in all magnitude. To avoid 
seasonality effects we always take the yearly change by comparing to the corresponding 
quarter of the previous year. The obtained margins show that during the collapse, most of 
the changes were on the intensive margin. But since 2010 the export intensity is no longer 
changing, and all the export growth comes from the extensive margin, most of it through 
new destinations for existing products. 
                                                     
7 Except on one occasions when CHINA coefficient is negative, what opposite to our expectations. 
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Next, we used a panel regression for all three margins to find key covariates. Summarizing, 
these are the main conclusions as to the determinants of export growth during and 
immediately after the crisis. First, during the trade collapse and recovery afterwards export 
growth is strongly affected by the destination market’s GDP. Hence demand matters a lot.  
Demand from foreign markets increases in particular the intensive margin, hence the value 
of existing trade. Hence European exporters who are strongly focused on the EU market 
hamper their export growth opportunities, although that seems to be a long-run effect that 
did not play a particular role during the crisis period. Secondly, the exporter’s home GDP 
growth increases exports too pointing to important supply side effects apart from a clear 
demand side effect. Thirdly, high unit labour costs deteriorate international 
competitiveness. In particular they reduce growth in the export intensive margin during and 
right after the crisis. Finally, Eurozone membership appears to protect exporters during and 
after the crisis. We find no evidence for trade credit, exchange rates, geographical 
orientation or product composition as determinants of export dynamics during this phase.  
In the post-recovery phase the determinants of export growth are slightly different. Export’s 
home GDP and unit labour costs are the main determinants, while export demand is not 
significant anymore. In this phase the geographical variables on average have no effect on 
total growth, but have an opposite effect on the intensive and extensive margin, which 
suggests that there is some geographical re-orientation towards non-EU markets. For 
example countries with a high share of intra-EU trade have a lower intensive margin and 
higher destination extensive margin. Eurozone exporters are no longer sheltered from the 
crisis, mainly due to the European sovereign debt crisis that followed the global crisis. 
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